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Safer installation with npm of lodestar-cli #3596
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This issue should only be closed if we implement something related to the shrinkwrap strategy or if that's abandoned |
Update on looking into this. Trying to create a shrinkwrap file in
Which is not surprising., given the documentation here mentioned:
The shrinkwrap can only be generated is from the root of the monorepo, but then the structure is different to what would have been generated if the command was ran specifically for In the meantime, I have a question on StackOverflow about this...but no solution/answer yet... |
It would be hard to estimate if your PR for this would be able to make it for the v1.7.0 release. Please consider providing a potential draft PR/solution for review so it's easier to identify whether or not we can include this. |
Not a high priority as we've mitigated by documenting to users how they should install Lodestar (not via npm). We should continue investigating a solution here. |
Have you considered using Deno as the execution environment and JSR as the package manager? JSR claims to be (source)
Here are some resources for more details: I’m not very experienced with them; it’s just an idea. |
yes, we are already exploring publishing packages to JSR cc @nazarhussain |
Describe the bug
Doing
is unsafe to dependency attacks, since the yarn.lock is not considered for dependency resolution.
Expected behavior
For npm installations, generate a package-lock.json (with https://github.com/imsnif/synp for example) and then generate a shrinkwrap file (see https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v8/commands/npm-shrinkwrap). The shrinkwrap should take precedence on installation. This generation should happen in CI when publishing.
For yarn installations: investigate
TODO
To reduce the attack surface we should count who many individual authors we rely on and minimize that number and / or ensure we have a sufficient level of confidence towards them.
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