diff --git a/src/content/posts/reading-notes-critique-of-pure-reason/index.md b/src/content/posts/reading-notes-critique-of-pure-reason/index.md
index 3db84d616..e9e592bf2 100644
--- a/src/content/posts/reading-notes-critique-of-pure-reason/index.md
+++ b/src/content/posts/reading-notes-critique-of-pure-reason/index.md
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Transcendental Aesthetic
 ------------------------
 
 Kant attempts to distinguish the contribution to cognition made by our receptive faculty of sensibility from that made
-solely by the objects that affectus, and argues that space and time are pure forms of all intuition contributed by our
+solely by the objects that affect us, and argues that space and time are pure forms of all intuition contributed by our
 own faculty of sensibility, and therefore forms of which we can have a priori knowledge.
 
 This is the basis for Kant's resolution of the debate about space and time that had raged between the Newtonians, who
@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ Leibnizians, who held space and time to be systems of relations, conceptual cons
 properties inhering in the things we think of as spatiotemporally related
 
 Kant's alternative to both of these positions is that space and time are neither subsistent beings nor inherent in
-things as they are in themselves, but are rather only
-forms of our sensibility, hence conditions under which objects of experience can be given at all and the fundamental
+things as they are in themselves, but are rather only forms of our sensibility, hence conditions under which objects of
+experience can be given at all and the fundamental
 principle of their representation and individuation
 
 Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although
-space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in !hem. Although
+space and time are _empirically real_, they are _transcendentally ideal_, and so are the objects given in them. Although
 the precise meaning of this claim remains subject to debate, in general terms it is the claim that it is only from
 the human standpoint that we can speak of space, time, and the spatiotemporality of the objects of experience, thus
 that we cognize these things not as they are in themselves but only as they appear under the conditions of our