diff --git a/src/content/posts/reading-notes-critique-of-pure-reason/index.md b/src/content/posts/reading-notes-critique-of-pure-reason/index.md
index 25e53bb63..21841d208 100644
--- a/src/content/posts/reading-notes-critique-of-pure-reason/index.md
+++ b/src/content/posts/reading-notes-critique-of-pure-reason/index.md
@@ -21,4 +21,11 @@ to this effect (A I, B I), and Kant's claim is that we can have "pure" or a prio
 experience made by the operation of these faculties themselves, rather than of the effect of external objects on us in
 experience. Kant divides our cognitive capacities into our receptivity to the effects of external objects acting on us
 and giving us sensations, through which these objects are given to us in empirical intuition, and our active faculty for
-relating the data of intuition by thinking them under concepts, which is called understanding
\ No newline at end of file
+relating the data of intuition by thinking them under concepts, which is called understanding, and forming judgments
+about them. This division is the basis for Kant's division of the "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements" into the
+"Transcendental Aesthetic," which deals with sensibility and its pure form, and the "Transcendental Logic," which deals
+with the operations of the understanding and judgment as well as both the spurious and the legitimate activities of
+theoretical reason.
+
+Transcendental Aesthetic
+------------------------
\ No newline at end of file