Merge pull request #2467 from barton2526/mention_cves

test: Add explicit references to related CVE's in comments

src/main.cpp

@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ bool CBlock::ConnectBlock(CTxDB& txdb, CBlockIndex* pindex, bool fJustCheck)
         // If such overwrites are allowed, coinbases and transactions depending upon those
         // can be duplicated to remove the ability to spend the first instance -- even after
         // being sent to another address.
-        // See BIP30 and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information.
+        // See BIP30, CVE-2012-1909, and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information.
         // This logic is not necessary for memory pool transactions, as AcceptToMemoryPool
         // already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
         // This rule was originally applied all blocks whose timestamp was after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
@@ -3528,7 +3528,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
         {
             AddOrphanTx(tx);
 
-            // DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded
+            // DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded (see CVE-2012-3789)
             unsigned int nEvicted = LimitOrphanTxSize(MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS);
             if (nEvicted > 0)
                 LogPrintf("mapOrphan overflow, removed %u tx", nEvicted);

src/validation.cpp

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx)
     if (GetSerializeSize(tx, (SER_NETWORK & SER_SKIPSUPERBLOCK), PROTOCOL_VERSION) > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE)
         return tx.DoS(100, error("CheckTransaction() : size limits failed"));
 
-    // Check for negative or overflow output values
+    // Check for negative or overflow output values (see CVE-2010-5139)
     CAmount nValueOut = 0;
     for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); i++)
     {