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Fix vuln OSV-2024-381 #5202
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Fix vuln OSV-2024-381 #5202
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src/H5Faccum.c
Outdated
@@ -881,6 +881,12 @@ H5F__accum_free(H5F_shared_t *f_sh, H5FD_mem_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED type, haddr_t addr | |||
H5_CHECKED_ASSIGN(overlap_size, size_t, (addr + size) - accum->loc, haddr_t); | |||
new_accum_size = accum->size - overlap_size; | |||
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|||
/* Ensure overlap_size and new_accum_size are within bounds */ | |||
if (overlap_size > accum->alloc_size || new_accum_size > accum->alloc_size) { |
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This fixes the specific vulnerability, but a more complete fix may be needed here. Consider the case where both overlap_size
and new_accum_size
end up slightly below accum->alloc_size
. It may make more sense to calculate a pointer to the last valid byte in accum->buf
and then make use of the H5_IS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW
macro from H5private.h.
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This fixes the specific vulnerability, but a more complete fix may be needed here. Consider the case where both
overlap_size
andnew_accum_size
end up slightly belowaccum->alloc_size
. It may make more sense to calculate a pointer to the last valid byte inaccum->buf
and then make use of theH5_IS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW
macro from H5private.h.
You are right. The current fix does not fully resolve the overflow
src/H5Faccum.c
Outdated
@@ -881,6 +881,11 @@ H5F__accum_free(H5F_shared_t *f_sh, H5FD_mem_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED type, haddr_t addr | |||
H5_CHECKED_ASSIGN(overlap_size, size_t, (addr + size) - accum->loc, haddr_t); | |||
new_accum_size = accum->size - overlap_size; | |||
|
|||
/* Ensure that the memmove operation won't overflow past the buffer's allocated size */ | |||
if (H5_IS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW(accum->buf + overlap_size, new_accum_size, | |||
accum->buf + accum->alloc_size)) { |
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Should be accum->buf + accum->alloc_size - 1
here
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Just another small fix needed for this PR
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This seems more like a fix for a symptom rather than the cause of the error. Why is the overlap wrong?
I'll investigate today and see if I can make a suggestion for a different change.
I've investigated this issue and it looks to be addressed in current versions of the library:
The original OSS-fuzz report is from last April, and it looks like the root cause (correctly detecting the corruption in the object header) has been fixed since then. |
So, unless this corrupted file is still causing problems, I'd recommend closing the issue as "already fixed". |
@qkoziol
|
Thank you for persisting and re-testing - I see that I was wrong in assuming that the library detecting the problem meant that it was fully fixed. I'll take another look at this. |
[Warning] This PR is generated by AI
PR Title: Fix Heap-Buffer-Overflow Vulnerability in HDF5 - OSV-2024-381
PR Description:
overlap_size
andnew_accum_size
) exceeded the allocated buffer size (alloc_size
), leading to a heap-buffer-overflow. This occurred due to the lack of bounds checking on these calculated values.Sanitizer Report Summary:
The sanitizer detected a heap-buffer-overflow when the program attempted to read 361 bytes from an offset -41 into a 520-byte heap buffer. The overflow occurred due to an incorrect calculation and lack of bounds checking in the
H5F__accum_free
function at/src/H5Faccum.c:885:17
. This issue propagated through multiple function calls, ultimately leading to a memory access violation.Full Sanitizer Report:
Files Modified:
src/H5Faccum.c
Patch Validation:
The patch has been validated using the provided PoC. It successfully resolves the heap-buffer-overflow issue identified in the sanitizer report. The program no longer exhibits the memory violation, and no new issues were introduced.
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