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src/content/posts/kant-view-of-mind-and-consciousness/index.md
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title: Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self | ||
published: 2024-07-24 | ||
description: 'Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self' | ||
image: './cover.png' | ||
tags: ["Theory"] | ||
category: 'Theory' | ||
draft: false | ||
--- | ||
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> Brook, Andrew and Julian Wuerth, | ||
> "[Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/kant-mind)", | ||
> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.) | ||
A Sketch of Kant's View of the Mind | ||
----------------------------------- | ||
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In general structure, Kant's model of the mind was the dominant model in the empirical psychology that flowed from his | ||
work and then again, after a hiatus during which behaviourism reigned supreme (roughly 1910 to 1965), toward the end of | ||
the 20th century, especially in cognitive science. Central elements of the models of the mind of thinkers otherwise as | ||
different as Sigmund Freud and Jerry Fodor are broadly Kantian, for example. | ||
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Three ideas define the basic shape ('cognitive architecture') of Kant's model and one its dominant method. They have all | ||
become part of the foundation of cognitive science. | ||
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1. The mind is a complex set of abilities (functions). (As Meerbote 1989 and many others have observed, Kant held a | ||
functionalist view of the mind almost 200 years before functionalism was officially articulated in the 1960s by | ||
Hilary Putnam and others.) | ||
2. The functions crucial for mental, knowledge-generating activity are spatio-temporal processing of, and application of | ||
concepts to, sensory inputs. Cognition requires concepts as well as percepts. | ||
3. These functions are forms of what Kant called synthesis. Synthesis (and the unity in consciousness required for | ||
synthesis) are central to cognition. | ||
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These three ideas are fundamental to most thinking about cognition now. Kant's most important method, the transcendental | ||
method, is also at the heart of contemporary cognitive science. | ||
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- To study the mind, infer the conditions necessary for experience. Arguments having this structure are called | ||
_transcendental arguments_. | ||
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:::tip | ||
Translated into contemporary terms, the core of this method is inference to the best explanation, the method of | ||
postulating unobservable mental mechanisms in order to explain observed behaviour. | ||
::: | ||
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To be sure, Kant thought that he could get more out of his transcendental arguments than just 'best explanations'. He | ||
thought that he could get _a priori_ (experience independent) knowledge out of them. Kant had a tripartite doctrine of | ||
the _a priori_. He held that some features of the mind and its knowledge had _a priori_ origins, i.e., must be in the | ||
mind prior to experience (because using them is necessary to have experience). That mind and knowledge have these | ||
features are _a priori_ truths, i.e., necessary and universal. And we can come to know these truths, or that they are | ||
_a priori_ at any rate, only by using _a priori_ methods, i.e., we cannot learn these things from experience (B3) (Brook | ||
1993). Kant thought that transcendental arguments were _a priori_ or yielded the _a priori_ in all three ways. | ||
Nonetheless, at the heart of this method is inference to the best explanation. When introspection fell out of favour | ||
about 100 years ago, the alternative approach adopted was exactly this approach. Its nonempirical roots in Kant | ||
notwithstanding, it is now the major method used by experimental cognitive scientists. | ||
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:::important | ||
Other topics equally central to Kant's approach to the mind have hardly been discussed by cognitive science. These | ||
include a kind of synthesis that for Kant was essential to minds like ours and what struck him as the most striking | ||
features of consciousness of self. Far from his model having been superseded by cognitive science, some things central | ||
to the model have not even been assimilated by it. | ||
::: | ||
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Kant's Critical Project and How the Mind Fits Into It | ||
----------------------------------------------------- | ||
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The major works so far as Kant's views on the mind are concerned are the monumental _Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)_ and | ||
his little, late _Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View_, first published in 1798 only six years before his death. | ||
Kant's view of the mind arose from his | ||
[general philosophical project](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/) in CPR the following way. Kant | ||
aimed among other things to, | ||
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- Justify our conviction that physics, like mathematics, is a body of necessary and universal truth. | ||
- Insulate religion, including belief in immortality, and free will from the corrosive effects of this very same | ||
science. | ||
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Kant accepted without reservation that “God, freedom and immortality” (1781/7, Bxxx) exist but feared that, if science | ||
were relevant to their existence at all, it would provide reasons to doubt that they exist. As he saw it and very | ||
fortunately, science cannot touch these questions. “I have found it necessary to deny _knowledge_, ... in order to make | ||
room for faith.” (Bxxx, his italics). | ||
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Laying the foundation for pursuit of the first aim, which as he saw it was no less than the aim of showing why physics | ||
is a science, was what led Kant to his views about how the mind works. He approached the grounding of physics by asking: | ||
What are the necessary conditions of experience? Put simply, he held that for our experience, and therefore our minds, | ||
to be as they are, the way that our experience is tied together must reflect the way that, according to physics, says | ||
objects in the world must be tied together. Seeing this connection also tells us a lot about what our minds must be | ||
like. | ||
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In pursuit of the second aim, Kant criticized some arguments of his predecessors that entailed if sound that we can know | ||
more about the mind's consciousness of itself than Kant could allow. Mounting these criticisms led him to some | ||
extraordinarily penetrating ideas about our consciousness of ourselves. | ||
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In CPR, Kant discussed the mind only in connection with his main projects, never in its own right, so his treatment is | ||
remarkably scattered and sketchy. As he put it, “Enquiry … [into] the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the | ||
cognitive faculties upon which it rests ... is of great importance for my chief purpose, ... [but] does not form an | ||
essential part of it” (Axvii). Indeed, Kant offers no sustained, focussed discussion of the mind anywhere in his work | ||
except the popular _Anthropology_. | ||
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In addition, the two chapters of CPR in which most of Kant's remarks on the mind occur, the chapter on the | ||
Transcendental Deduction (TD) and the chapter on what he called Paralogisms (faulty arguments about the mind mounted by | ||
his predecessors) were the two chapters that gave him the greatest difficulty. (They contain some of the most | ||
impenetrable prose ever written.) Kant completely rewrote the main body of both chapters for the second edition | ||
(though not the introductions, interestingly). | ||
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In the two editions of CPR, there are seven main discussions of the mind. The first is in the Transcendental Aesthetic, | ||
the second is in what is usually called the Metaphysical Deduction. Then there are two discussions of it in the | ||
first-edition TD, in parts 1 to 3 of Section 2 and in the whole of Section 3 and two more in the second-edition TD. The | ||
seventh and last is found in the first edition version of Kant's attack on the Paralogisms, in the course of which he | ||
says things of the utmost interest about consciousness of and reference to self. (What little was retained of these | ||
remarks in the second edition was moved to the completely rewritten TD.) For understanding Kant on the mind and | ||
self-knowledge, the first edition of CPR is far more valuable than the second edition. Kant's discussion proceeds | ||
through the following stages. | ||
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### Transcendental Aesthetic | ||
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Kant calls the first stage the Transcendental Aesthetic. It is about what space and time must be like, and how we must | ||
handle them, if our experience is to have the spatial and temporal properties that it has. This question about the | ||
necessary conditions of experience is for Kant a 'transcendental' question and the strategy of proceeding by trying to | ||
find answers to such questions is, as we said, the strategy of transcendental argument. | ||
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Here Kant advances one of his most notorious views: that whatever it is that impinges on us from the mind-independent | ||
world does not come located in a spatial nor even a temporal matrix (A37=B54fn.). Rather, it is the mind that organizes | ||
this 'manifold of raw intuition', as he called it, spatially and temporally. The mind has two pure forms of intuition, | ||
space and time, built into it to allow it to do so. ('Pure' means 'not derived from experience'.) | ||
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### Metaphysical Deduction | ||
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The Aesthetic is about the conditions of experience, Kant's official project. The chapter leading up to the | ||
Transcendental Deduction, The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding has a very different | ||
starting point. | ||
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Starting from Aristotelian logic (the syllogisms and the formal concepts that Aristotle called _categories_), Kant | ||
proceeds by analysis to draw out the implications of these concepts and syllogisms for the conceptual structure (the | ||
“function of thought in judgment”) within which all thought and experience must take place. The result is what Kant | ||
called the Categories. That is to say, Kant tries to deduce the conceptual structure of experience from the components | ||
of Aristotelian logic. | ||
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**Thus, in Kant's thought about the mind early in CPR, there is not one central movement but two, one in the | ||
Transcendental Aesthetic and the other in the Metaphysical Deduction. The first is a move up from experience (of | ||
objects) to the necessary conditions of such experience. The second is a move down from the Aristotelian functions of | ||
judgment to the concepts that we have to use in judging, namely, the Categories. One is inference up from experience, | ||
the other deduction down from conceptual structures of the most abstract kind.** | ||
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### Transcendental Deduction, 1st Edition | ||
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Then we get to the second chapter of the Transcendental Logic, the brilliant and baffling Transcendental Deduction (TD). | ||
Recall the two movements just discussed, the one from experience to its conditions and the one from Aristotelian | ||
functions of judgment to the concepts that we must use in all judging (the Categories). This duality led Kant to his | ||
famous question of right (_quid juris_): with what right do we apply the Categories, which are not acquired from | ||
experience, to the contents of experience?. Kant's problem here is not as arcane as it might seem. It reflects an | ||
important question: How is it that the world as we experience it conforms to our logic? In briefest form, Kant thought | ||
that the trick to showing how it is possible for the Categories to apply to experience is to show that it is _necessary_ | ||
that they apply. | ||
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TD has two sides, though Kant never treats them separately. He once called them the objective and the subjective | ||
deductions. The objective deduction is about the conceptual and other cognitive conditions of having representations of | ||
objects. It is Kant's answer to the quid juris question. Exactly how the objective deduction goes is highly | ||
controversial, a controversy that we will sidestep here. The subjective deduction is about what the mind, the | ||
“subjective sources” of understanding, must as a consequence be like. The subjective deduction is what mainly interests | ||
us. |
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