Fix path traversal #3
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Do not fail if the output directory already exists.
The code was implementing a path traversal check based on the detection
of '..' in directory names and file names. This is sufficient to protect
against path traversal attacks using relative paths but insuficcient for
attacks using absolute paths.
This is due to the fact that the second argument of os.path.join() takes
precedence if it starts with '/':
>>> print(os.path.join('outdir', '/tmp/hacked'))
/tmp/hacked
|
We have an upcoming publication about similar vulnerabilities affecting different extractors in ubi-reader, jefferson, yaffshiv, and binwalk. We requested CVEs for each of these vulnerability so that users are aware they should upgrade to the latest version (through dependabot for example). The one that should be fixed by this PR has been assigned CVE-2023-0593. |
This was referenced Jan 31, 2023
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The code was implementing a path traversal check based on the detection of
..in directory names and file names. This is sufficient to protect against path traversal attacks using relative paths but insufficient for attacks using absolute paths.This is due to the fact that the second argument of
os.path.join()takes precedence if it starts with/:Added the same check we used for ubireader (see onekey-sec/ubi_reader@c6a1272).