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whitelist: minor restructuring
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some cleanup, simplify extending the code (for example adding additional members to the TopDir struct)
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@smitsohu
smitsohu committed Feb 26, 2022
1 parent 6dfab9e commit 72deb4f
Showing 1 changed file with 58 additions and 56 deletions.
114 changes: 58 additions & 56 deletions src/firejail/fs_whitelist.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -49,21 +49,25 @@ static void whitelist_error(const char *path) {
exit(1);
}

static int whitelist_mkpath(const char* path, mode_t mode) {
static int whitelist_mkpath(const char *parentdir, const char *relpath, mode_t mode) {
// starting from top level directory
int parentfd = safer_openat(-1, parentdir, O_PATH|O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
if (parentfd == -1)
errExit("open");

// work on a copy of the path
char *dup = strdup(path);
char *dup = strdup(relpath);
if (!dup)
errExit("strdup");

// only create leading directories, don't create the file
char *p = strrchr(dup, '/');
assert(p);
if (!p) { // nothing to do
free(dup);
return parentfd;
}
*p = '\0';

int parentfd = open("/", O_PATH|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (parentfd == -1)
errExit("open");

// traverse the path, return -1 if a symlink is encountered
int fd = -1;
int done = 0;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -97,24 +101,35 @@ static int whitelist_mkpath(const char* path, mode_t mode) {
tok = strtok(NULL, "/");
}

if (done)
fs_logger2("mkpath", path);
if (done) {
char *abspath;
if (asprintf(&abspath, "%s/%s", parentdir, relpath) < 0)
errExit("asprintf");
fs_logger2("mkpath", abspath);
free(abspath);
}

free(dup);
return fd;
}

static void whitelist_file(int dirfd, const char *relpath, const char *path) {
static void whitelist_file(const TopDir * const top, const char *path) {
EUID_ASSERT();
assert(relpath && path);
assert(top && path);

// check if path is inside top level directory
size_t top_pathlen = strlen(top->path);
if (strncmp(top->path, path, top_pathlen) != 0 || path[top_pathlen] != '/')
return;
const char *relpath = path + top_pathlen + 1;

// open mount source, using a file descriptor that refers to the
// top level directory
// as the top level directory was opened before mounting the tmpfs
// we still have full access to all directory contents
// take care to not follow symbolic links (dirfd was obtained without
// take care to not follow symbolic links (top->fd was obtained without
// following a link, too)
int fd = safer_openat(dirfd, relpath, O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
int fd = safer_openat(top->fd, relpath, O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: skip whitelist %s\n", __LINE__, path);
Expand All @@ -130,17 +145,15 @@ static void whitelist_file(int dirfd, const char *relpath, const char *path) {
return;
}

// now modify the tmpfs:
// create mount target as root, except if inside home or run/user/$UID directory
if ((strncmp(path, cfg.homedir, homedir_len) != 0 || path[homedir_len] != '/') &&
(strncmp(path, runuser, runuser_len) != 0 || path[runuser_len] != '/'))
if (strcmp(top->path, cfg.homedir) != 0 &&
strcmp(top->path, runuser) != 0)
EUID_ROOT();

// create path of the mount target
int fd2 = whitelist_mkpath(path, 0755);
int fd2 = whitelist_mkpath(top->path, relpath, 0755);
if (fd2 == -1) {
// something went wrong during path creation or a symlink was found;
// if there is a symlink somewhere in the path of the mount target,
// assume the file is whitelisted already
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: skip whitelist %s\n", __LINE__, path);
close(fd);
Expand All @@ -149,7 +162,7 @@ static void whitelist_file(int dirfd, const char *relpath, const char *path) {
}

// get file name of the mount target
const char *file = gnu_basename(path);
const char *file = gnu_basename(relpath);

// create mount target itself and open it, a symlink is rejected
int fd3 = -1;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -212,16 +225,23 @@ static void whitelist_file(int dirfd, const char *relpath, const char *path) {
fs_logger2("whitelist", path);
}

static void whitelist_symlink(const char *link, const char *target) {
static void whitelist_symlink(const TopDir * const top, const char *link, const char *target) {
EUID_ASSERT();
assert(link && target);
assert(top && link && target);

// confirm link is inside top level directory
// this should never fail
size_t top_pathlen = strlen(top->path);
assert(strncmp(top->path, link, top_pathlen) == 0 && link[top_pathlen] == '/');

// create files as root, except if inside home or run/user/$UID directory
if ((strncmp(link, cfg.homedir, homedir_len) != 0 || link[homedir_len] != '/') &&
(strncmp(link, runuser, runuser_len) != 0 || link[runuser_len] != '/'))
const char *relpath = link + top_pathlen + 1;

// create mount target as root, except if inside home or run/user/$UID directory
if (strcmp(top->path, cfg.homedir) != 0 &&
strcmp(top->path, runuser) != 0)
EUID_ROOT();

int fd = whitelist_mkpath(link, 0755);
int fd = whitelist_mkpath(top->path, relpath, 0755);
if (fd == -1) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: cannot create symbolic link %s\n", __LINE__, link);
Expand All @@ -230,7 +250,7 @@ static void whitelist_symlink(const char *link, const char *target) {
}

// get file name of symlink
const char *file = gnu_basename(link);
const char *file = gnu_basename(relpath);

// create the link
if (symlinkat(target, fd, file) == -1) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -285,7 +305,7 @@ static void globbing(const char *pattern) {
}

// mount tmpfs on all top level directories
static void tmpfs_topdirs(const TopDir *topdirs) {
static void tmpfs_topdirs(const TopDir * const topdirs) {
int tmpfs_home = 0;
int tmpfs_runuser = 0;

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -329,9 +349,7 @@ static void tmpfs_topdirs(const TopDir *topdirs) {
fs_logger2("whitelist", RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR);

// restore /run/user/$UID directory
// get path relative to /run
const char *rel = runuser + 5;
whitelist_file(topdirs[i].fd, rel, runuser);
whitelist_file(&topdirs[i], runuser);
}
else if (strcmp(topdirs[i].path, "/tmp") == 0) {
// fix pam-tmpdir (#2685)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -371,12 +389,7 @@ static void tmpfs_topdirs(const TopDir *topdirs) {
// restore user home directory if it is masked by the tmpfs
// creates path owned by root
// does nothing if user home directory doesn't exist
size_t topdir_len = strlen(topdirs[i].path);
if (strncmp(topdirs[i].path, cfg.homedir, topdir_len) == 0 && cfg.homedir[topdir_len] == '/') {
// get path relative to top level directory
const char *rel = cfg.homedir + topdir_len + 1;
whitelist_file(topdirs[i].fd, rel, cfg.homedir);
}
whitelist_file(&topdirs[i], cfg.homedir);
}

// user home directory
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -720,9 +733,6 @@ void fs_whitelist(void) {
entry = entry->next;
}

// release nowhitelist memory
free(nowhitelist);

// mount tmpfs on all top level directories
tmpfs_topdirs(topdirs);

Expand All @@ -732,24 +742,13 @@ void fs_whitelist(void) {
if (entry->wparam) {
char *file = entry->wparam->file;
char *link = entry->wparam->link;
const char *topdir = entry->wparam->top->path;
size_t topdir_len = strlen(topdir);
int dirfd = entry->wparam->top->fd;
const TopDir * const current_top = entry->wparam->top;

// top level directories of link and file can differ
// whitelist the file only if it is in same top level directory
if (strncmp(file, topdir, topdir_len) == 0 && file[topdir_len] == '/') {
// get path relative to top level directory
const char *rel = file + topdir_len + 1;

if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: file: %s; dirfd: %d; topdir: %s; rel: %s\n", __LINE__, file, dirfd, topdir, rel);
whitelist_file(dirfd, rel, file);
}
whitelist_file(current_top, file);

// create the link if any
if (link) {
whitelist_symlink(link, file);
whitelist_symlink(current_top, link, file);
free(link);
}

Expand All @@ -762,12 +761,15 @@ void fs_whitelist(void) {
}

// release resources
free(runuser);

size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < nowhitelist_c; i++)
free(nowhitelist[i]);
free(nowhitelist);

for (i = 0; i < TOP_MAX && topdirs[i].path; i++) {
free(topdirs[i].path);
close(topdirs[i].fd);
}
free(topdirs);
free(runuser);
}

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