Please contact us directly at [email protected] for any bug that might impact the security of this project. Please prefix the subject of your email with [security] in lowercase and square brackets. Our email filters will automatically prevent these messages from being moved to our spam box. All emails that do not include security vulnerabilities will be removed and blocked instantly.

In addition to a dedicated email address to receive security related reports, we also have a Hacker1 account that can be used for communicating security related issues.

You will receive an acknowledgement of your report within 24 hours of notification.

If you do not receive an acknowledgement within the said time frame please give us the benefit of the doubt as it's possible that we haven't seen it yet. In this case please send us a message without details using one of the following methods:

• Give a poke on Twitter @3rdEden
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Once we have acknowledged receipt of your report and confirmed the bug ourselves we will work with you to fix the vulnerability and publicly acknowledge your responsible disclosure, if you wish.

Leading control characters are not removed. This allows an attacker to bypass hostname checks and makes the extractProtocol method return false positives.

• Reporter credits
  • Haxatron
  • GitHub: @haxatron
  • Twitter: @haxatron1
• Huntr report: https://www.huntr.dev/bounties/57124ed5-4b68-4934-8325-2c546257f2e4/
• Fixed in: 1.5.9

A URL with a specified but empty port can be used to bypass authorization checks.

• Reporter credits
  • Rohan Sharma
  • GitHub: @r0hansh
• Huntr report: https://www.huntr.dev/bounties/55fd06cd-9054-4d80-83be-eb5a454be78c/
• Fixed in: 1.5.8

A specially crafted URL with empty userinfo and no host can be used to bypass authorization checks.

• Reporter credits
  • Haxatron
  • GitHub: @haxatron
  • Twitter: @haxatron1
• Huntr report: https://www.huntr.dev/bounties/83a6bc9a-b542-4a38-82cd-d995a1481155/
• Fixed in: 1.5.7

Incorrect handling of username and password can lead to authorization bypass.

• Reporter credits
  • ranjit-git
  • GitHub: @ranjit-git
• Huntr report: https://www.huntr.dev/bounties/6d1bc51f-1876-4f5b-a2c2-734e09e8e05b/
• Fixed in: 1.5.6

url-parse mishandles certain uses of a single (back) slash such as https:\ & https:/ and interprets the URI as a relative path. Browsers accept a single backslash after the protocol, and treat it as a normal slash, while url-parse sees it as a relative path.

• Reporter credits
  • ready-research
  • GitHub: @ready-research
• Huntr report: https://www.huntr.dev/bounties/1625557993985-unshiftio/url-parse/
• Fixed in: 1.5.2

Using backslash in the protocol is valid in the browser, while url-parse thinks it’s a relative path. An application that validates a url using url-parse might pass a malicious link.

• Reporter credits
  • CxSCA AppSec team at Checkmarx.
  • Twitter: Yaniv Nizry
• Fixed in: 1.5.0

The extractProtocol method does not return the correct protocol when provided with unsanitized content which could lead to false positives.

• Reporter credits
  • Reported through our security email & Twitter interaction.
  • Twitter: @ronperris
• Fixed in: 1.4.5

url-parse returns wrong hostname which leads to multiple vulnerabilities such as SSRF, Open Redirect, Bypass Authentication Protocol.

• Reporter credits
  • Hacker1: lolwaleet
  • Twitter: @ahm3dsec
  • Blog: 0xahmed.ninja
• Hacker1 report: https://hackerone.com/reports/384029
• Triaged by Liran Tal
• Fixed in: 1.4.3