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EIP-1014: Use keccak256 name instead of sha3 #1247

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6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions EIPS/eip-1014.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -10,14 +10,14 @@ created: 2018-04-20

### Specification

Adds a new opcode at 0xf5, which takes 4 stack arguments: endowment, memory_start, memory_length, salt. Behaves identically to CREATE, except using `sha3(msg.sender ++ salt ++ init_code)[12:]` instead of the usual sender-and-nonce-hash as the address where the contract is initialized at.
Adds a new opcode at 0xf5, which takes 4 stack arguments: endowment, memory_start, memory_length, salt. Behaves identically to CREATE, except using `keccak256(msg.sender ++ salt ++ init_code)[12:]` instead of the usual sender-and-nonce-hash as the address where the contract is initialized at.

### Motivation

Allows interactions to (actually or counterfactually in channels) be made with addresses that do not exist yet on-chain but can be relied on to only possibly eventually contain code that has been created by a particular piece of init code. Important for state-channel use cases that involve counterfactual interactions with contracts.

#### Option 2

Use `sha3(0xff ++ msg.sender ++ salt ++ init_code)[12:]`
Use `keccak256(0xff ++ msg.sender ++ salt ++ init_code)[12:]`

Rationale: ensures that addresses created with this scheme cannot collide with addresses created using the traditional `sha3(rlp([sender, nonce]))` formula, as 0xff can only be a starting byte for RLP for data many petabytes long.
Rationale: ensures that addresses created with this scheme cannot collide with addresses created using the traditional `keccak256(rlp([sender, nonce]))` formula, as 0xff can only be a starting byte for RLP for data many petabytes long.